Abstract: A detailed analysis of failure modes for seadikes has been performed and was used to derive a complete set of limit state equations for the description of failure scenarios of seadikes. These models and scenarios were then used to calculate the respective failure probabilities and the overall failure probability by a fault tree approach. A simple example of a non-existing seadike was used to illustrate the procedure. Details of parameters, model uncertainties and their influences on the results as well as further information required for the aforementioned procedure are also discussed.
INTRODUCTION
Sea dikes are amongst the most important coastal structures along German coastlines and many other coasts in the world (Fig. 1) . They usually protect low-lying coastal areas which are highly vulnerable to coastal and or river flooding. Generally, the design of such structures is still based on purely deterministic or quasideterministic approaches and is either based on the design water level superimposed by the maximum wave-run-up or on admissible wave overtopping rates under extreme storm surge conditions. Geotechnical failure modes of seadikes are often disregarded and not properly accounted for in the design process. Reliability and risk based design concepts have been increasingly proposed during the last years (see e.g. the concept in Oumeraci and Kortenhaus, 2002) . The probabilistic methods on which these concepts are based allow to account for the uncertainties in the input parameters and the models describing possible failure modes of various types of coastal structures. However, these methods are very often limited to simple cases or to just one or a couple of failure modes.
It was therefore found necessary to understand the hydrodynamic loading and the underlying physics of failures of dikes before embarking into detailed analyses on probabilistic methods and applying them to such structures. Therefore, a German research project was initiated by the authors in 2001 which focuses on the probabilistic design of seadikes based on a deeper understanding of the underlying hydromechanical and geotechnical processes. Some details of the results found in this project will be discussed in this paper.
CONCEPT

General procedure
The method used within this paper follows a risk-based design approach as for example discussed by Oumeraci and Kortenhaus (2002) in these proceedings. To predict the flooding risk R for existing coastal defence structures it is necessary to evaluate the probability of failure P f of the respective sea defence and the potential damages E(D) resulting from failure. The risk can then be estimated as the product of the probability P f and the damage E(D). This paper concentrates solely on the deter-mination of P f based on seadikes since this type of defence structure is dominant along the German coastlines. Furthermore, only one single cross section is considered so that 3-dimensional effects and separation of various sections along the defence line is not needed.
The concept of how to determine the overall probability of failure for a seadike is illustrated in Fig. 2 . The figure shows a nine-step-procedure which starts with a deterministic design and the selection of the most relevant failure modes for which limit state equations have to be determined. These initial three steps are purely deterministic and are essentially based on failure analyses which will be described in the following section. Step 3 already shows strong links with the set-up of a fault tree (step 7) which can be used to schematise the failures which have been observed at seadikes. Following this method a deterministic fault tree can be derived which can later be used for probabilistic design.
Steps 4 and 5 discuss the uncertainties of parameters and models which will be included in the probabilistic design. The description of the uncertainties as used in this study will be discussed in more detail in one of the following sections. In step 6 the probability of failure of all limit state equations is performed by means of Level II and III (Monte-Carlo) analyses. Steps 7 and 8 discuss the relation between the failure modes and the calculation of the overall probability of failure. In step 9 of the procedure some optimisation routines may be used to optimise the dimensions of the defence structure. This can be done by minimising costs or adopting target probabilities (for details on optimisation of defence systems see Voortman, 2002) . However, this step will not be discussed here any further.
Definition of failure
Step 2 and 3 of the procedure described in Figure 2 require the analysis of failure modes and a suitable model to describe it. In comparison to deterministic approaches this needs a definition of "failure" which can later be used for probabilistic design, too. All limit state equations are therefore expressed as the difference between a resistance term R and the stress term S so that:
In this study failure is defined as negative z-values. The three examples in Figure 3 are used to illustrate the differences between the general deterministic understanding of failure in comparison to a probabilistic definition. In Figure 3a overtopping over a dike crest can be seen. Depending on the allowable amount of overtopping this is usually acceptable and will not be regarded as failure. Figure 3b shows an erosion hole of the seaward slope of a seadike after a severe storm surge. In general this may be looked at as failure since the design of the cover layer of the dike has not been dimensioned properly. In probabilistic sense this is no failure since flooding did not occur (provided that the overall top event of a probabilistic fault tree is defined to be flooding of the hinterland of a dike). However, the probability of failure can be significantly higher than in the overtopping case. From these observations it is obvious that limit state equations are needed to describe e.g. the erosion process at the seaward side of the dike in a probabilistic sense. Figure 3c shows a complete failure of the dike (from both the deterministic and probabilistic "viewpoint") where flooding occurred.
ANALYSIS PROCEDURE
The steps as described in Figure 2 are presented in more details in the following. The deterministic steps of finding the failure modes and the appropriate limit state equations are based on an extensive failure analysis which will be discussed first.
Failure analysis
Based on the results of a detailed failure analysis of sea and estuary dikes (Oumeraci & Schüttrumpf, 1999) failure mechanisms have been identified which may eventually lead to breaching of the dike. These procedures are shown in Figure 4 for the seaward and the shoreward side of the dike (Fig. 4a ) and 4b), respectively). Principally, the dike can fail from the seaside, the shoreward side or from inner erosion (not shown in Fig. 4 ). All relevant processes as shown in Figure 4 need to be described and possibly simplified by limit state equations (LSE). An example how this has been done for the seaward slope is shown in Figure 5 . The processes on the shoreward side of the dike are slightly more complex but can be simplified in the same way . The inner erosion of the dike may result from piping or matrix erosion, providing that the water level in front of the dike persists over a longer time. The latter has been accounted for by calculation of the seepage time through the dike body as an initial boundary condition. • in case of revetments steps 1 and 2 can be replaced by a description of the failure of the revetment • Steps 3 and 4 can be summarised by one limit state equation (LSE) describing the time until failure • the breaching of the dike will be a description of the time until the breach has initially formed, the development of the full breach width will be ignored 
Limit state equations
The simplified processes as discussed in the previous section need to be described by limit state equations. For this purpose a detailed review from methods available in literature was performed to arrive at suitable models (for an overview see Table 1 ). However, some of the processes cannot be described by analytical formulae yet so that simplifications or simple models based on physical understanding of the processes were derived. Indications for these models are also given in Table 1 together with a reference to literature, the physical parameter which are compared in the limit state equation and the units used. Table 1 shows that nine limit state equations are based on comparison of storm duration with the resisting of the dike to withstand the respective loading. Therefore, (i) the correct assumption on the storm duration is very important; and (ii) models which are dependent on time need to be linked together to one model only to consider time appropriately. The latter will be explained in more detail in the subsequent sections of this paper. 
Fault tree
Based on the failure analysis described in the previous section and various descriptions of fault trees in literature (see e.g. Kuijper & Vrijling, 1998) a detailed fault tree was set up (Fig. 6 ) comprising about 30 different failure mechanisms. "Flooding" was defined to be the top-event of the fault tree. A   T1   T2  T3   T4  T5   T6  T7   T8   T9   T18   T12   T10   T13  T14   T15   T16 The independence of failure modes from each other was carefully checked and adjusted if possible. All failure mechanisms discussed in the previous section have been considered in the fault tree. Firstly, spreadsheet calculations were performed to determine the deterministic safety coefficients η = R / S in order to check the limit state equations and the critical failure modes. Furthermore, comparison to results taken from literature has been performed.
Results have shown that critical failure modes are the descriptions of erosion at the seaward and the shoreward side (given that the overtopping is high enough) of the dike. These calculations and comparisons have shown that the models work properly and that results are in the right range.
Application to a non-existing seadike
The fault tree and the limit state equations have been applied to a non-existing dike with an artificial cross sections with a berm on the seaward and the shoreward side of the dike (Fig. 7) . Some geometrical parameters such as height, slopes and thickness of clay cover were taken from examples along the German coastline to generate a dike which is not too different from reality. The dike shown in Figure 7 was used for all probabilistic calculations which are discussed in the following.
Uncertainty evaluation
A total number of 87 input parameters are needed to describe (i) the geometry of the dike (27 parameters), (ii) the hydromechanic boundary conditions (13), and (iii) the geotechnical input parameters (47). A large number of uncertainties of the input parameters could be assessed from the analysis of published and non published documents, leaving only some geometric and geotechnical parameters where no information was available.
The information available for the uncertainties (standard deviation σ or coefficient of variation σ') and the distribution type of parameters is however very limited in literature. Therefore it was decided to take a normal (Gaussian) distribution and a standard deviation based on engineering experience (textbooks and communication with practitioners) if no data are available or described in literature. The magnitude and the type of distribution was then varied in a sensitivity analysis (see next section) to identify the importance of these parameters. A complete overview of uncertainties and how they were modelled is given in Kortenhaus and Oumeraci (2002) .
Probabilistic calculations
The aforementioned procedure was applied to the example dike and compared to other calculations given in references. Due to the complexity of most of the models used almost all calculations were performed as Level III (Monte-Carlo) simulations. Whenever possible, simple LSE were calculated as Level II (FORM) calculations. A comparison of both methods (where possible) showed that generally the Level III calculations gave slightly higher probabilities of failure.
The calculation of gates in the fault tree was performed as shown in Table 2 
Generally, all failure modes were assumed to be fully independent from each other. However, in the sensitivity analysis this assumption was varied and fully dependent failure modes were assumed (for more details see the next section).
The overall failure probability of the virtual seadike was P f = 8.4·10 -6 . The failure modes which most strongly contributed to these results were the models describing the erosion of the seaward slope and the model for breaching of the dike. As already discussed in the previous section it was necessary to overcome the limitations when calculating time dependent failure modes. Therefore, a scenario fault tree was developed following the idea of minimal cut-sets. The overall probability of failure will then increase to P f = 5,1·10 -5 showing that ignoring the influence of time may lead to an order of magnitude difference between results. More details describing this approach can be found in Kortenhaus and Oumeraci (2002) .
Comparisons were also performed to calculation of overall failure probabilities of seadikes in literature. The comparison was not always simple as in many times other models for the failure modes are used in the references. However, the results have generally shown that (i) the detailed results obtained from this study always result in lower probabilities of failure; and (ii) the differences between the results obtained here and other results may be up to two orders of magnitude. It may be concluded from these results that the failure analysis based approach and detailed consideration of the failure modes is very meaningful in order to achieve more accurate results than using methods which are based on design water levels.
Sensitivity analysis
A detailed sensitivity analysis of parameters, failure mechanisms, and uncertainties was performed to identify the following influences.
! model factors describing the uncertainties of the models themselves; ! uncertainties of parameters; ! type of distribution of input parameters (for simplicity reasons model factors were always assumed to be Gaussian distributed); ! dependency of failure modes to each other; ! dependency of failure modes from time With respect to failure modes and fault trees the most important results from this sensitivity analysis were: ! influence of model factors on results is generally very low. Only the models for overtopping and piping are widely influenced by variations of model factor uncertainties. Since a lot of data are available for overtopping the model factor for this LSE is relatively well known and will not vary strongly. This means that only piping needs some further investigation on the accuracy of the model used (Weijers and Sellmeijer, 1993) , improvements of other models used here will not result in much lower failure probability of the dike; ! analysis of the parameter uncertainties have shown that the design water level and the sea state parameters (storm duration, wave period, wave height) have the strongest influence on the overall failure probability. This is mainly due to two reasons (i) these parameters are used in many failure mode models, and (ii) for many failure modes they have the strongest influence on the individual failure probability ! the type of distribution was investigated by comparing normal to log-normal and Weibull 2 distributions. Generally, this has led to no significant changes in the individual failure probabilities, only showing some slight decreases in probabilities when Weibull distributions are used
Further details and more results from this sensitivity analysis can be obtained from Kortenhaus and Oumeraci (2002) and will be published in future papers on that subject.
CONCLUSIONS
The aforementioned analysis procedure is an essential starting point for a reliability based design and is based on a detailed analysis of the failure modes. In this study new models for describing failure modes of sea dikes have been developed or improved. Based on these models together with an extensive fault tree for sea dikes probabilistic calculations have been performed to arrive at overall failure probabilities of sea dikes. The key results of this study are:
! the overall failure probabilities of sea dikes may be significantly reduced if an approach is used which is based on the analysis of failure; ! the most important models contributing to the overall probability of failure are all models describing the erosion process of the outer slope, the inner slope is only relevant if the water level is much higher and overtopping volumes are increasing; ! the erosion process at the seaward and shoreward slope is not well understood up to now and future work should be concentrated on these aspects; ! the uncertainties of the models are much lower than initially expected (exceptions are wave overtopping and piping) so that further research in these areas would not result in lover failure probabilities; ! most relevant parameters for design of sea dikes are the water level and some sea state parameters (storm duration, wave period, wave height).
